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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
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Mr. President:
As the Senate

~<nows,

I have b een presenting during the current

session a series of cbservations on the international situation.

,Phcn I began

this series some months ago , it seemed to me that a need existed for a genera l
review of co nditions thr ouGhout the world and the prob lems which these conditions
po se for cu r fo reign policy.
Y'e have witnessed m any changes in the internatio nal situation during
the past year.

If our foreig n policy is to serve the peace and well - being o f the

United States, it mu st keep pace with thet>e changes.

It must be adjusted when

and where the need for adjustment exists.
Essential adjust m ents are not likely to be made, however, without
public understanding of the issues involved .

Nor are they likely to be made

unless the Government is willing to face these issues with perception, with
ho nesty and with c o urage.
The initiative for change in foreign policy must come largely from
the Executive Branch because of the s pecial obligatio ns of the President in this
ccnnection.

But we in Congress, in the Senate, are not without our own

responsibilities under the C ons titution to speak out, t o advise, and to consent on
foreign policy .
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That tho ugh t has prc ;n pted this

11

Review of Foreign Policy".

In

previous remarks I have dealt with the situatio n in Southeast Asia, North
Africa, the Middle East, the Vestern He mispherc and the African Continent.

In

these addresses I have been attempting to bring to the attention of the Senate what
I believed to be the essential facts respecting each region and the co urse which
this country has followed in coping with tthose facts.

Where possible, I have

advanced suggestions in the hope that they might be helpful in improving our
po licies,
This series is n o w drawing to a close.

Before completing it, I want

to co nsider the areas which have been, in effect, the main concentrations of
American po licy du r ing the past decade .

One of these areas is Europe.

It is the

situation in that continent -- the changing situation in that continent - - that I wish
to cover in my remarks today .
Our relations with Europe are of vital importance to us not only in
themselves but also in their influence on our policies elsewhere .

I have

discus sed at length in previous statements how considerations arising out of the
European situation color our policies in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia
and other areas.

Sometimes, in my judgment, these adjustments of policy have

been valid, or at least understandable, and in others they have not been.
notre-describe this inter-relationship at length today.

I shall

I believe it sufficient at

this point Merely to reemphasize the fact that we have not infrequently taken
major positions elsewhere which we wou l d probably not have taken except out o f
concern for the attitudes and interests of the countries of We stern Europe.

That
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such is the case is an indicator of the indirect significance of E'urope in our total
policy.
As for the importance of our direc t relations with the Eu r opean continent, Members of the Senate are well aware that this country has participated in
two major wars, both of which originated largely in crises in Europe.

They know,

too, that the bulk of our post-war expenditures for foreign aid have been directed
to that continent and that some of our most extensive military commitments for
mutual defense have Likewise been undertaken in concert with the European
nations.
It is obvious, therefore, that E'urope lies close to the core of our

foreign policy .

There are many reasons why that is the case.

that they are valid reasons, they add up to this:
well-being of this nation can be profoundly

To the extent

The freedom, the peace and the

decisively - - influenced by what

transpires in the lands across the Atlantic.
I have no desire to revive the old and tattered debate as to whether
Europe is more, less or equally as important as the Far Fast in our foreign
relations .

In any event, I intend to dea l with the latter region at a later time .

let me say now, though, that in the modern world, for better or for worse, we
cannot insulate this nation against the tremendous impact of European develop ments on our security and well-being .
Just one example should suffice to demonstrate why that is so.
budget for national defense this year is 40 billion dollars.

Our

That is the sum which

the American people take out of their earnings and their wages to support our
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army, navy and air force.

It is a heavy burden but we sustain it for the sake o f

the safety o f the nation.

·vre might well asl< ourselves what that burden wo uld be, what would
c0me ,)Ut of our earnings and wages for national defense if the countries of
Western Europe were not free, if they were not linked in peaceful ties with the
United States.

Suppose, instead, the great productive capacity, the skills and

genius of that region had been impelled into a hostile totalitarian camp after
World War II.

What would be the levy on ourselves for national defense at the

present time?

Eighty billion dollars?

Twice the present burden?

Three times?

Is it not probable that the l evy would have also included the cost of a third world
war and that we might now be living awid its ruins if indeed we were living at all?
When we become irked with the responsibilities of foreign policy and especially
those which relate to Europe, these are some of the questions that we would do
well to aslc ourselves .
No r is defense -- mutual security -- the sole basis for the great
significance of Eu r ope in our foreign relations .

Are we so prosperous, so self-

sufficient in an economic sense that we can dismiss lightly an annual trade with
Vlestern Europe of $7. 5 billion?

How many jobs, what return to American

ind'.lstry and agriculture does this trade represent?
Can we, finally, ienore the contributicn in science, religion and art
which Europe has made and can continue to make to our national progress?

To

cite just one specific example, h e w many years mi ght it have taken for us to
develop atomic energy without the work of Ein s t e in, Fermi and other European

- 5 scientists?

Without their contribution, would we have achieved atomic weapons

before enemies bent on our destruction during World War II?
There is no need to labor the point, Mr. President,

It is clear that

many bonds, both visible and invisible, stretch across the ocean between Europe
and America.

They are, for the most part, useful and mutually helpful bonds.

They may rub us uncomfortably and irritatingly at times,
the Europeans suffer similar adverse effects on occasion.

I have no doubt that
Relations among

nations are not much different in this respect than among human beings.

If I may

use a word which the Secretary of State has popularized in recent months, however, it is the "totality" of the relationship that counts.
Most Americans, I believe, are aware that in this totality, there is
an important identity of interest between the European nations and the United
States.

Our foreign policy over the past decade has interpreted this awareness

with great fidelity.

The M:arshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, the North Atlantic

Treaty Crganization, the restoration of a free Western Germany within the
Western community -- these measures are the highlights of a policy that has
continually expressed the deep interest, the enlightened self-interest of this
nation, in the survival and strengthening of a free Europe.
I am sure many rr>istakes have been made during this post-war period
in carrying out our policy with respect to Europe, some noticed, some unnoticed.
Mistakes will always be made s o long as foreign relations continue to be
co nducted by human beings.
Republicans.

It will be so with Der.1ocrats as well as with

- 6 Let us by all means take reasonable precautions against mistakes
and recognize and correct them when they arc made.

But let us not bec0me so

obsessed with mistakes that we dry up the well-springs of courage and initiative
which this country must have to adapt to the inte rnational life of our times .
Nor should we in an unseemly eagerness to find fault with ou rselv es
and others ignore the fact that the enormous achievements of past policy would
not have been possible without some risk and irritation.

Let us ask ourselves

what our national position would now be if we had not dared to help the free
European nations to recover from V'orld War II.

What would our 3ituation be had

we not interposed the strength of this country between an exhausted Europe and
the expansionist dreams of the power -mad dictator to the East?
I believe the citizens of this country know that intelligent foreign
policies eve r the past decade, mistakes and irritations notwithstanding, have
done much to preserve freedom and peace in Weste rn Europe and, in so doing,
have served the deepest interests o f the United States.

If doubts as to the effectivenes:> of our foreign policy are now
developing, Mr. President, it is because there has appeared in this government
a tendency to seek refuge in the security of successful past pol ides rather than
to explore the unknown o f new policies, an exploration which is essential to meet
the changing pattern of the international situation.
provide a base on which to build.
remain effective forever.

The past can guide.

It can

But foreign policies effective once do not

If they are to serve the interests of this nation, they

must remain a vital element in our national life.
past but they cannot idle in the past.

They may evolve out of the
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A policy that served the American people in 1')45 was no longer
entirely applicable in l 950 .

\'!hat was helpful in 1953 can be a hindrance in 1956

unless we adjus t it to the realities of 1956,
These realities with respect to Europe are vastly different than
they were just a short time ago.
changing rapidly.

The European situation is changing and it is

The changes, as I understand them, Mr . President, radiate

from three principal geographic sources, from within Western Europe, from
within the Soviet system in ,'{es tern Europe and fr om within the whole of Germany.
Cu r policies, however, have been slow to accept the fact of change in
Europe.

They have gone on in the old familiar patterns ,

It is on ly in recent

weeks, with the Secretary of State in this country, that there have been

sign~

of

an awake ning o n the part of the Executive Braach to the need for adjustments .
Unfortunately, the hour is already late.
Press correspondents and other observers have long been alert to the
emergence of new trends in Europe and they have reported them accurately and
pr o mptly to the American public.

Membe rs of Congress have also noted these

trends in their missions abroad.

The Executive Branch, however, despite the

vast and costly array of information-gathering facilities at its command, seems
to be the last to learn the truth.

I wonder sometimes at the efficacy of these

facilities or at least at the capacity of the responsible authorities in the Executive
Branch to act on the info rmation which they may supply .
In appraising the changes in Eu r ope, Mr . President, I should like to
turn first to the area which is of most direct concern to us, to Western Europe.

- 8 Since the end of World ".far II cur policy has been aimed at the pref:crvation of
freedom in that area.

It has also sought closer collaboration as among the

Western European democracies themselves and with us and ethers in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organizatton .
For reasons of which I have already spoken, these have been valid
cbjectivcs of American policy.

')ur people, expressing themselves through

Congress, have consistently supported them.

The Europeans, other than the

Communists, have generally welcomed t.hem .
It is not diffi cult to find evidence of the success of this policy of
support of freedom and close collaboration in Western Europe .

The region has

not only recovered from V!orld 'l!ar II in an economic sense but has rec ove r ed so
thoroughly that its peoples are reaching out for new and unprecedented standards
of living.

The Europeans now have mo re military strength to resist the pressures

of totalitarianism from without and within .

They have also moved a considerable

distance towards integration as among themselves.

·vrith other free nations,

moreover, they have participated in building up the commc.n defense structure
of NATO.
A casual observer, Mr . President, might find the picture I have jusc
drawn a most encouraging one.

It is.

The only trouble with it, howevt!r, is that

it is incomplete.
Progress in

~'/este rn

it has not been unalloyed.

Europe has indeed been real and extensive but

There are shadows as well as highlights in the

situation and it is a function of res ponsiule government to bring both to the
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attention of the American people.

If the Executive Branch is unable to paint a

full and accurate picture cf our predicament -- the dark as well as the light - the Senate is not without capacity to do so .

I hope that my colleagues will not

attribute to me a dour outlook on life if I now make an effort in that direction with
respect to :Jestern Europe.
I should like to turn first to the question of V'lestern European integration.

I noted a moment ago that \.he ·'{estern European nations had made consider-

able progress in that direction over the past decade.

For many reasons, that

progress is of greatest impo rtance to the future of Europe.

In the first place,

integration is a key to the end of the suicidal wars which have torn at the vitals
of Yves tern civilization over the past century.

Furthermore, it is a key to the

rising standards of living which the peoples of v.Testcrn Europe are demanding
with increasing insistence from their political and economic systems.

Integra-

tion is important, finally, because, together, the European nations will be able
to maintain, in greater security, a higher degree of freedom than each could
ever expect to do alone .
We ought not to underestimate the difficulties which confront the
nations of 'ivestern Europe in a further march towards unity.
interests which conspire against it are great .

The vested

The suspicions are ancient.

The

fears are deep.
Without underestimating these difficulties, however, we should also
recognize the urgent necessity of overcoming them.

A united Europe is not only

the great promise of the Twentieth Century for the people of that continent .
may well be their last hope of free survival.

It

- 10Unfortunately, M r. President, after moving forward impressively
with such underta!cings as the Coal and Steel Community and W'estern European
Union, Furopc may now be retreat1ng from the goal.

Certainly, the moment is

long overdue for further progres:) in the integration of power facilities, transportation, markets and currencies.
The great test of the future of unity in Europe may well come in the
matte r cf atomic energy.

I s there sufficient strength in the concept of

Europeanisrn to harness the creative talents of European science and industry
in a common ef!ort to develop this great new source of power?
prospect for the acceptance of some such plan as Euratom?

Is there real

If there is not, it is

not too difficult to envision the end of the surface prosperity and c0operation
which the Western European nations now enjoy in a new outbreak of cutthroat
nationalistic rivalries.
In the larger grouping of the free nations in NA TC the same shadows
of divisiveness that have appeared in Vfestern Europe are also apparent.
deadlock over Cyprus has turned allies against one another in
breaks and repri!ials.

A

terroristic out-

The dispute has disrupted the eastern defense structure

of NATO and jeopardized the stability of the entire Middle East .
Mr. President, I know that this country, standing outside the conflict,
cannot fully apprecia te the interests and attachments which are at stake in
Cyprus f.n British, Gre eks and Turks.

Are the stakes so important, can they

be so important, that they are each prepared to gamble their own future and the

-11- common future of NATC on a trial by continued strife?

Can there be greater

risks to any of them in a resumption of negotiations or the acceptance of the
conciliation of friendly nations?
Beyond Cyprus and the similar distracting difficulties of the French
in North Africa, lies the whole question of the erosion not on ly of the military
structure of NATO but of the very concept of NATO itself.

There are some who

attribute this erosion to the decline of the danger of Soviet military aggression in
Europe and to the outdating of the organization by the development of new nuclear
weapons.

I think it more accurate, Mr . President, to attribute it to an excess ive

eagerness on the part of other free nations and ourselves to discard the irksome
burdens of preserving peace.

When I was in Europe last fall, I noted this

tendency which was already strong in the wake of the Geneva conference.

I made

this observation with respect to it in a public report to the Committee on Foreign
Relations:

''If we confuse an atmosphere of peace with the
actuality of peace we have no one to blame but ourselves.
If we rush to disarm before agreements on disarmament
with proper safeguards have been achieved, the fault is our
own. If at the first sign of peace each of the nations in the
'/!estern alliance begins to pursue policies which ignore
the needs of the others, it will not require any great
skill on the part of the Soviet Union to disintegrate NATO
and the other instruments of Western unity. They will soon
fall apart of their own accord.''
In making that observation, Mr. President, I did not mean to imply
that NATO should be reg arded as something sacrosanct.

Certainly, changes in

that o rganization should be made and they shou ld be made promptly, if they are
necessary.

Military structures are not designed to last unchanged in perpetuity.

-12The dangers to NATO do nol lie in an intelligent adjustment o f its
strategy and its requirements to a changing situation.

The dangers lurk in

haphazard adjustment, in changes dictated not by political and military realities,
but by wishful thinking and the unilateral pursuit of short-range mterests by
member-states.
Even if the threat of Soviet aggression has receded, even if, as some
speculate, mutual possession of super-bombs has now given us the cold comfort
of a peace of "mutual terror" - - even if that were the case, is the need for
Weste rn cooperation any less pressing? If the concept of NATO·.·' ::.

·.·! ·:-·

!'"

' ;· · r · -- the concept of the mutual defense of free nations -- is obscured, h ow

long will it be before new threats to these nations will arise from outside or
perhaps even from within the group itself:?
There are some who contend that NATO is essentially negative in
purpose, that the survival of the organization depends on the existence of a
specific and incipient military danger.

Certainly, the Soviet threat was a factor

in the creation of the NATO but is it the only factor?

Have we forgotten that

twice in this century, our civilization has skirted the edge of doom, that twice
our heritage has been tossed recklessly into the fires of war, by conflicts which
began within VTeste rn Europe and spread their great damage in that region?
Communism fed on these conflagrations.

After the wars the Communists probed

among the charred and smoking ruins and tore down nations and ideals which had
been severely weakened by the conflicts .

That is the destructive role which

communisr.n has occupied in the contemporary world and we must not lose sight
-not
of it. By the same token, however, il is essential/to obscure the fact that the
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greatest dama ge to the free natic ns has been largely self-1nflicted.

It has re-

s uited fr o m their own inner disunity, and partict>larly the disunity of the \i-'estern
European regio n.
Both great wars o f this century in the first instance were atlempted
suicides on the part of vlestcrn Europe .

The critlcal danger of totalitarianism

came after, no t before, these massive assaults which the region launched upon
itself.

And only as a way is found to cope with tendenc:iel:i of this kind will the

free nations develo p real security against comm1mism and other forms of
to tali tarianis m.
That is why, for years, many of us have urged that attention be
directed to the positive side of NATO .

The recent pro posal of the Secretary of

3tate to develop the "totality" of NATO is a step in that direction but it is a
belated and halting step and may well have produced only a 1oirage.

When this

matter was discussed at the May meeting of the NATO Council, scarcely 15 minutes was devoted to it and it appears as though the proposal were already on the
way to

~the bureaucratic

bein ~ n

side-issue of which agency or organization shall

do what.
What is fundamental is not whether NATO itself is reinforced in its
rwn-military aspects or other non-military organs of ,:'/estern cooperation are
given greater vitality.

V!hat

~important

is that the NATO nations retain and

strengthen that unity of outlook on which the freedom of each ultimately depends .
v'!hat

~important

is that they continue to express this unity in deeds.

vlhat is

impc rtant is that they continue to search out and develop means by which free
governments, working together, can better serve their citizens and their
int e rests.

comn~on
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The free nations need this strength of common purposes now more than
ever before.

We; need :t because the changes which arc tak1ng place within the

Soviet bloc will confront us with great dangers and great opportunities in the
months and years ahead.

Th~se

changes are not of r<;cent vintage.

been maturing at least since the death of Stalin.

They have

But w..; have been slow in this

instance, as in the case of v'.Jestern Europe, to recognize the fact.
It is not yet clear what these changes will produce within the Soviet Union,

whether they are forerunners of fundamental shifts in the Communist system or
simply the prelude to a new and tighter tyranny.

We would do well, in any

event, not to become overly fascinated by the thrilling mystery stories that
are bemg published by the present Soviet leaders.

Absorbed in this literature

of escapism, we are overlooking the fact that the meaning of the changes is already becoming abundantly clear in the area that is of

gr~atest

importance to us.

That is the area of Soviet relations with other nations.
In that area, the changes add up to a vast effort to push the interests of
Soviet communism not by the crude tactics of a Stalin but by the traditional
techniques of d1P.omacy, trade and exchange .

In commenting on these changes

two years ago in the Senate, I noted:
"There are great stakes involved .... Here it is
not a matter of a few r esources, a few strategic positions and a
reluctant people being seized by the Communists and dragged 1nto
their camp. . . . . The willing allegiance or the benevolent
neutrality of entire nations is involved .
"The Communists arc striving by a combwation of
diplomacy and economic enticements to drive the free nations
further and further apart and to draw as many of them as possible
into their orbit or into an intermediate stage of neutralism. "

- 15 If we continue to blind ourselves to the power of these new tactics, we

shall do so only at our own risk.

It is inexcusable to fail to recognize the

impact which they are already producing through-out the world.
are felt in Asia, iu Europe, in Latin America and in Africa.

Their effects

The tactics

register, even in such ancient enemies of Soviet communism as Iran, Spain,
and Japan.

In Europe, communist parties begin to take on a new respectability,

and if present trends continue, it may not be long before 'united fronts'' again
appear in the European parliaments.
Let us face the dimensions of the threat of these new tactics in all
honesty.

They appeal to a world sick of war and the threat of war.

They appeal

to nations with a great need to enlarge their trade if they are even to maintain
living standards which in some cases arc but a small fraction of what we have
in this country.

They appeal to countries anxious to speed up their technical

progress.
It is precisely because they do appeal in this fashion that the Soviet

tactics present such a danger to freedom.

They draw independent nations away

from the resp:>nsibilities of preserving fXlace.
between these nations.

They permit wedges to be driven

They move poverty-stricken, underdeveloped countries

into closer alinement with Soviet totalitariansim.

We cannot stop this trend

either by sanctimonious admonitions or by efforts to outbid the Soviet Union in
enticements.

In some instances, experience is the only teacher of the truth

and we shall have to wait until the lessons are learned.

- 16 If the shift in Soviet tactics creates these dangers to freedom, it also

opens up opportunities.

If

we ~

are neither disconcerted, discouraged or

divided by the sudden Russian emergence into the free world, if

W>e

do not

cower i11 the face of the dangers which it produccs, we may yet be able to seize
these opportunities.

If we have the courage and the initiative which freedom

demands of its adherents, we may find that the door of the closed totalitarian
world which has now swung outward may also be made to swing inward.

The

Soviet Uni.on may discover that it cannot travel out into the world of freedom
and expect the repressed states of Eastern

Euro~

to remain obediently at

home.
If we are to take the opp:>rtunities which may follow in the wake of the

changes within the Soviet bloc, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the aims of
totalitarian communism do not change.

We must keep clearly in mind that

totalitarianism survives only by feeding its fears and ambitions in an ever-widening tasture of domination.
It will do us little good, though, to repeat the fact that th.:.: goals of
communism do not change, as though it were some sort of htany, if we fail
to recognize at the same time that many roads lead to Communist domination.
The goals of the Communists do not change but the ways in which they seek the
goals do change and have changed.
Until now, we have keyed our policies larg ely to meet a sudden Soviet
military thrust to world domination and we must continue to be prepared for that
contingency.

But can we ignore any longer the fact that Communist progress

towards that goal is now being registered by means othe1· than military?

- 17 If the day ever comes when free men no longer have the will to rise

together to meet a military challenge, on that day freedom will begin to die.
In the same fashion, if the day ever comes when free men can rise together
only to meet a military challenge, on that day freedom will have lost its meaning.
It is small comfort, therefore, that

w~

have built high the walt of

military containment only to find that communist totalitarianism moves up,
around, and

und~r

the wall with the tools of economic penetration . and diplomatic

maneuver.
Nowhere is the danger of Soviet achievement in this connection greater
than in the third zone of great change in Europe, in Germany.

We have watched

that nation rise up out of the ruins of World War II, to become once again a
powerful and independent force, the decisive force in the fate of Europe.
Until now, Germany has looked to the West.

Are we, however , on the

verge of witnessing a great shift?
The pressures for change are rising in Germany . They are rising out
of the issue of frustrated umficatlon.

They are rising out of resistance to

rearmament and military commitments to NATO.

They are rising out of the

search for economic and trade oppntunities in the east.

They are rising out

of the dying promise of Western European unity .
These pressures, lv·r. President, I believe, are turning the outlook of
Germany away from the .Vest, not toward the East but perhaps 1nward and backward to a past built on neutralism and revival of nationalistic excess.

The fact

that this past is underscored with disaster for Germany and Europe, as Chancellor
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Adenauc-r and others in the Bottr:l government knO\V only too well, may not be a
sufficient deterrent.

The pressures for change may be too powerful even for

an Adenauer to curb, especially 1f the Soviet Union should choose to throw mto
the situation the di}iomatic and other resources of its new taches at a critical
moment.
This country has rested its policies respecting Germany on the shoulders
of one man, a great and able man.

The Soviet Union, however, is in a position

to align its policies with the tremendous forces that are at work in Germany,
forces with historical roots that go back decades and centuries, forces which
will be in operation long after the Chancellor and every Member of this chamber
have gone.
As I noted in rem arks appended to the Record in 1954:
"The Russians could withdraw their occupation forces
and expand the nucleus of German militarism which already exists
in the East German communits army. They could, in other words,
offer Germany a unification with real nationalistic inducements and
ask in return only that the Germans separate themselves from Western
Europe. 11
The flexibility of Soviet di}iomacy has placed the Russians in a position
to manipulate a development of that kind.

They control the East German govern-

ment and they have di}iomatic relations with Bonn.

They have begun, in recent

weeks, the withdrawal of their occupation forces from Germany.
Will they now go further and accept the Bonn government as a nucleus
of political control for all Germany and ask only that a place be made for the
communist-trained East German army in the new Reich?

Will they acquiesce

19in expanded German trade with the countries of Eastern Europe, the countries
which lie along the road from Berlin to Istanbul, a traditional line of German
commercial

~netration?

1 do not know how far the Russians will go.

1 believe, however, that they

witt go to great lengths to dissolve the bonds which hold together the free nations,
from Greece and Turkey to Scandinavia, and to reduce the influence of the United
States on the European continent and in surrounding areas .
Mr. President, I have sought in my remarks to survey the changes
which confront Amer1can policy with respect to Europe.

What we see today are

only the dim outlines of what may take place in the months and years ahead.
Unless we act to preserve and strengthen the basic foundation of freedom and
peace in Europe, the floodgates wilt surely open, and the tidal wave will overwhelm 1ruch of the constructive effort of the past decade.
promise of unit in Western Europe.

It will cover NATO,

It will carry away the
It will drive American

influence from Europe; it will prepare the ground for totalitarianism and a World
War III.
There may still be an opportunity to forestall this sequence of events.
But we shall miss the opportunity if we comfort ourselves with a pleasant portrait
of European developments, as the Executive Branch has been doing these past
months.

Vv e shall miss it unless we begin first by recognizing the total situation

which confronts us in Europe.
Seen in that tight, the changes on that continent raise for the foreign
poticy of this country three great problems: (l) to provide the leader ship which
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which will preserve and str e ngth e n the in s titutions o£ common action which have
already been established among the free nations; (2) to recognize the dangers
inherent in the n e w Soviet tac tics and at the same time to seiz e th e oppo r tunities
which they may also create; and (3) to facilitate the unification of Germany and
to insure the continuance of its bas i c t i e s with the We stern nations.
Mr. President, I know that these problems are easi e r stated than met.
Yet, it is not impossible to delineate the outlines o£ a p::>licy that might meet
them .

I list in conclusion some of the elements which I believe are e ssential to

such a policy:
l.

VIe should be prepared to offer the Good Offices of the United State s

in a search for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question.
2.

We should support the prompt inclusion of Spain, Tunisia and Morocco

in NATO and the latter two in the United Nations.
3.

We should consider sympathetically any reasonable r e quest which

emanates from France and is supp::>rted by bona fide nationalist leaders in
Algeria for assistance in ending the conflict in that region.
4.

We should urge a frank, formal and full- scale reexamination of the

strategic concepts and the financial and manpower requirements of NATO,
while at the same time this country reexamine s its own foreign aid program.

.. .
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5.

We should convene, as I hav e lo ng urged, an economic conference

of the NATG nations with a view to increasing commerce as amo ng ourselves
and establishing uniform standard s for trade with the Soviet bloc, recognizing
that if we fail t o do s o , we shall run the risk of undermining necessary
restrictions in a mad scramble for market s in that region.

6.

We should be prepared, on a mutually beneficial basis, to offer

extensive c o operation in nuclear matters to Euratom, if it is established, and
we sho uld make clear the terms of our offer promptly.
7.

If circumstances permit, we should increase the size of our

diplo matic missions m the Eastern European countries, to the end that we may
be more fully informed on trends in that area.

8.

We should extend the provisions of legislation involving surplus

a g ricultural stocks to the Eastern European countries, provided there is

a#~t~~:fc,~ these countries,

recognizing

that the children and the destitute must be exempt frcm conflicts of ideologies
in any po licy which is worthy of this country.
9.

We should recognize frankly the resistance to rearmament in

Germany and reassess the need for it within the context of the negotiation of sound
agr e ements o n disarmament.

